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ABSTRACT: The complicated physical and political geography of the Eastern Mediterranean 
makes it a region in which conflicts between parties are always ready to escalate. In this context, 
the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the Libya’s Government 
of National Accord seem to add fuel to the fire. Apart from the impact on the energy geopolitics 
of the Eastern Mediterranean, this agreement has raised the concerns of the European Union 
which considers that it infringes upon the sovereign rights of Greece and cannot produce any legal 
consequences for an EU member State.
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LA DELIMITACIÓN MARÍTIMA ENTRE TURQUÍA Y EL GOBIERNO DE ACUERDO 
NACIONAL DE LIBIA: ¿OTRA PREOCUPACIÓN PARA LA UNIÓN EUROPEA?
RESUMEN: La complicada geografía física y política del Mediterráneo Oriental lo convierte 
en una región en la que los conflictos entre las partes siempre están listos para escalar. En este 
contexto, la adopción de un Memorando de Entendimiento entre Turquía y el Gobierno de Acuerdo 
Nacional de Libia parece que añadir leña al fuego. Aparte del impacto en la geopolítica energética 
del Mediterráneo Oriental, este acuerdo preocupa a la Unión Europea, que considera que vulnera los 
derechos soberanos de Grecia y que no puede tener efecto jurídico alguno para un Estado miembro 
de la UE.
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LA DELIMITATION MARITIME ENTRE LA TURQUIE ET LE GOUVERNEMENT 
LIBYEN D’UNION NATIONAL: UNE AUTRE PREOCCUPATION POUR L’UNION 
EUROPÉENNE ?
RÉSUMÉ: La géographie physique et politique compliquée de la Méditerranée orientale en fait une 
région où les conflits entre les parties sont toujours prêts à dégénérer. Dans ce contexte, l’adoption 
d’un mémorandum d’accord entre la Turquie et le gouvernement libyen d’union national semble 
mettre de l’huile sur le feu. Outre l’impact sur la géopolitique énergétique de la Méditerranée 
orientale, cet accord a suscité l’inquiétude de l’Union européenne qui considère qu’il porte atteinte 
aux droits souverains de la Grèce et ne saurait avoir de conséquences juridiques pour un Etat membre 
de l’UE.
MOTS CLES: Méditerranée orientale; Délimitation; MoU; Union Européenne; Relations Union 
Européenne-Turquie.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, pending delimitation issues may remain dormant until coastal 
States compete for offshore resources in the same maritime region, or new 
navigational or strategic interests arise. Currently, this is the case in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
With the evolution of  the law of  the sea in the direction of  extended 
jurisdictions of  coastal States, strategic locations became an asset for the 
projection of  power in a wider regional context. The Eastern Mediterranean, 
which encompasses Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the State 
of  Palestine, Egypt and Libya,2 is still fraught with challenges. In the light of  
the United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS),3 Greece 
has concluded maritime delimitation treaties with some neighbouring States. 
However, Turkey, which has not signed UNCLOS, refused for decades to claim 
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Mediterranean under international 
law. In this game board, the European Union (EU) has been involved in the 
Mediterranean Sea as a major diplomatic player.4
2 The United Kingdom is also present through UK Sovereign Base Areas of  Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia on the island of  Cyprus.
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) UNTS 31363.
4 Köchler, H., “Kastellorizo: The Geopolitics of  Maritime Boundaries and the Dysfunctionality 
of  the Law of  the Sea”, International Progress Organization, 2020, p. 33.
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At the outset of  the new century, large gas reserves were discovered in 
the territorial waters of  several coastal States in the East Mediterranean Sea.5 
This discovery reactivated conflicts in the region concerning the delimitation 
of  maritime boundaries. Discovery of  gas fields off  the coast of  Cyprus also 
aggravated the tensions between the Republic of  Cyprus and Turkey that had 
existed since the 1974 Turkish invasion of  Cyprus and subsequent division of  
the island.6
The Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU) on the delimitation of  the 
maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean concluded between Turkey 
and the Libya’s Government of  National Accord (GNA)7 exacerbates the 
problem, and together with the agreement between Greece and Egypt,8 
may have created a situation of  fait accompli concerning any future agreement 
between Turkey and Greece.9 Concurrently, Ankara is hampering the efforts 
of  Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Egypt to develop East Mediterranean gas 
exploitation, putting a barrier across the gas pipeline project that would run 
from Israeli and Greek-Cypriot waters to the Greek island of  Crete, on to the 
Greek mainland and into Europe’s gas network via Italy.10
5 The United States Geological Survey estimates the waters of  Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, 
and Palestine contains 122.4 trillion cubic feet of  technically recoverable gas. To date, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Israel, and Palestine have discovered gas. Bowlus, J., “Eastern Mediterranean gas: 
Testing the field”, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/special/eastern_med/
gas_fields (accessed on 28 July 2021). 
6 staniceK, B., “Turkey: Remodelling the Eastern Mediterranean”, European Parliament Brief, 
2020, p. 2.
7 Memorandum of  Understanding between the Government of  the Republic of  Turkey 
and the Government of  National Accord-State of  Libya on Delimitation of  the Maritime 
Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean (adopted 27 November 2019, entered into force 8 
December 2019).
8 Agreement between the Government of  the Hellenic Republic and the Government of  the 
Arab Republic of  Egypt on the delimitation of  the exclusive economic zone between the two 
countries (adopted 6 August 2020, entered into force 2 September 2020).
9 Köchler, H., op. cit.; Bayar, G., “Turkey, Libya deal prevents fait accompli in E. 
Mediterranean”, Anadolu Ajansı, 3 December 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-
libya-deal-prevents-fait-accompli-in-e-mediterranean/1661929 (accessed on 1 July 2021).
10 Baker, L., Gumrukcu, T., Kambas, M., “Turkey-Libya maritime deal rattles East 
Mediterranean”. Reuters, 25 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-
libya-eastmed-tensions-explain-idUSKBN1YT0JK (accessed on 25 June 2021).
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The conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean brings together intertwined 
disputes over energy resources, overlapping claims regarding maritime 
boundaries, and geopolitical dominance.11 This paper will focus on the clash 
between Turkey, on one side, and Greece (supported by the EU), on the other 
side following the MoU between Turkey and Libya. Special emphasis will be 
placed on the reaction of  the EU, who has reaffirmed its full solidarity with 
its member State,12 as the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean comes at a low 
point in EU-Turkey relations. 
II. DELIMITING THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA: AN UNCERTAIN MISSION
Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean are animated by a host of  underlying 
conflicts. In a proximate sense, they are caused largely by disagreements over 
access to and ownership of  energy resources, particularly gas.13 These disputes 
can be traced back to the early 1970s, when Turkey granted petroleum 
exploration permits in the Aegean Sea over areas of  seabed that Greece 
claimed belongs to its islands.14 Furthermore, the unresolved nature of  the 
sovereignty over Cyprus persists to torment the neighbouring relationships.15
1. A general overview of applicable delimitation rules
Given the geographic proximity in the Eastern Mediterranean, the 
delimitation of  the maritime zones is challenging. UNCLOS sets out the 
principles for delimitation of  the territorial sea, the continental shelf  and 
the EEZ between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, namely, that they 
must reach agreement on the basis of  international law, in order to achieve 
11 Bloch, A., Saber, I., “What’s Driving the Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean?”, Lawfare, 25 
January 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-driving-conflict-eastern-mediterranean 
(accessed on 24 June 2021).
12 European Council, Conclusions, 12 December 2019, EUCO 29/19 CO EUR 31 CONCL 9.
13 Bloch, A., Saber, I., loc. cit. 
14 GeorGopoulos, A., “Delimitation of  the Continental Shelf  in the Aegean Sea”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1988, pp. 90-126, p. 91.
15 During the past century, two political currents were promoted in Cyprus based on ethnic 
foundation: the annexation (enosis) of  the whole island of  Cyprus to Greece and the partition 
(taksim) of  the island into Turkish and Greek portions. After the coup d’état which overthrew 
the government of  Greek Cypriot leader Makarios in 1974, Turkey occupied the northern 
third of  the island.
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an “equitable solution”. However, the pure implementation of  UNCLOS 
principles runs into limitations in such a crowded sea.
Turkey claims rights based on the natural prolongation of  its continental 
shelf,16 an approach that severely limits the rights of  its neighbours. Turkey 
insists that the delimitation should be effected on the basis of  equity, taking 
into account relevant circumstances, including that it possesses the longest 
coast in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the aim of  achieving an equitable 
solution.17 Considering the presence of  islands as a relevant circumstance, 
Ankara emphatically states that islands cannot have a cut-off  effect on the 
coastal projection of  Turkey, as islands that lie on the “wrong side of  the 
median line between two mainlands cannot create maritime jurisdiction 
beyond their territorial waters”18, because “their presence distorts equitable 
delimitation”.19
However, according to Article 121 of  UNCLOS, islands “enjoy the same 
status, and thus generate the same maritime rights, as other land territory.”20 
Furthermore, as recognised by decided cases, the legal definition of  an island 
and the maritime entitlements of  an island are part of  customary international 
law: “the legal regime of  islands set out in UNCLOS Article 121 forms an 
indivisible regime, all of  which […] has the status of  customary international 
law.”21
Thus, even though Turkey is not a State Party to the Convention, these 
customary law principles, which establish that Greek islands are entitled to own 
16 Turkey argues that the Aegean seabed is geographically a natural prolongation of  the 
Anatolian landmass.
17 Başeren, S.H., Dispute Over Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas, TÜDAV, Istanbul, 
2010, p. 92.
18 Letter dated 18 March 2020 from the Permanent Representative of  Turkey to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
19 Erciyes, C., “Eastern Mediterranean Turkey’s Legal and Political Views”, Presentation 
delivered on 5 February 2020, Brussels ,https://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/Eastern-
Mediterranean-Turkey-s-Legal-and-Political-Views-5-February-2020.pdf  (accessed on 24 
June 2021).
20 Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), Judgement, [2001] ICJ Reports 2001, p. 40, para. 185.
21 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgement, [2012] ICJ Reports 2012, 
p. 624, para. 139.
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maritime zones to the same degree as any other land territory, are applicable,22 
unless it could be shown that Turkey qualifies as persistent objector to the rule 
that islands are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf.
Not only the legal regime of  islands, but also the principles for delimiting 
the territorial sea and continental shelf  boundaries of  States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts, reflect and include customary international law.23 These 
principles rely on the three-stage delimitation method, namely, the drawing of  
a provisional equidistance line, the adjustment or shifting of  that line based on 
the presence of  relevant circumstances, and the (dis)proportionality test.24 The 
application of  this method would likely limit the scope of  the Turkish EEZ 
and continental shelf.25 
2. Maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean
Despite developments in international jurisprudence and State practice 
on maritime delimitation, the delimitation of  maritime zones in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea has not been accomplished.26 Out of  the 15 maritime 
boundaries to be drawn in the region, only five27 have been agreed upon 
through bilateral treaties, namely, Cyprus-Egypt, Cyprus- Lebanon, Cyprus-
Israel, Turkey-Libya, and Greece-Egypt.28
The Republic of  Cyprus, as an internationally recognized independent 
State and Party to UNCLOS, possesses the maritime zones projected by its 
22 norris, A., “Troubled Waters in the Eastern Mediterranean”, EJIL: Talk, https://www.
ejiltalk.org/troubled-waters-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/ (accessed on 24 June 2021).
23 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)... cit., p. 624, para. 139.
24 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgement, [2009] ICJ Reports 
2009, p. 61, para. 119-122.
25 lindenstrauss, G., Feuer, s., winter, o., “The Perils of  the Turkey-Libya Maritime 
Delimitation Deal”, INSS Insight, No. 1238, 2019, p.1.
26 yiallourides, C., “Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea: 
Progress and Outstanding Legal Issues”, Eastern Mediterranean Affairs Magazine, Issue 2, 2021, 
pp. 29-28, p. 32.
27 Interestingly, Turkey considers its continental shelf  boundary with the Turkish Republic of  
Northern Cyprus to be delimited as per the Continental Shelf  Delimitation Agreement of  21 
September 2011. Letter dated 25 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of  Turkey to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
28 yiallourides, C., “Maritime Boundary Delimitation”... cit.
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648 kilometres of  coastline. Cyprus proclaimed its EEZ in 200429 and has 
negotiated maritime boundary delimitation agreements with Egypt,30 Lebanon 
(non-ratified yet)31 and Israel32, principally based on the equidistance method. 
It remains for Cyprus to delimit its maritime zones with Greece as well 
as with Turkey. However, the latter is unlikely in the current setting, given 
that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of  Cyprus.33 For this reason, 
Cyprus enshrined in its law of  201434 that in the absence of  an agreement 
with a State whose coasts lie opposite - that is to say Turkey - the equidistance 
method would apply until an agreement is reached. To this end, in 2019 Cyprus 
published the coordinates of  the limits of  its continental shelf  and of  its EEZ 
to the north and northwest.35
29 Law to provide for the Proclamation of  the Exclusive Economic Zone by the Republic of  
Cyprus, 2 April 2004.
30 Agreement between the Republic of  Cyprus and the Arab Republic of  Egypt on the Delimitation 
of  the Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 February 2003 (entry into force 7 March 2004).
31 Agreement between the Government of  the Republic of  Cyprus and the Government of  
the Republic of  Lebanon on the Delimitation of  the Exclusive Economic Zone (signed 17 
January 2007, not yet in force). Cyprus and Lebanon signed the agreement for the delimitation 
of  their EEZ in January 2007. This agreement was ratified by Cyprus, but not by Lebanon, 
which objected to the agreement on the delimitation of  the EEZ between Israel and Cyprus 
signed in December 2010. Gowlland-deBBas, V., “The Legal Framework of  Lebanon’s 
Maritime Boundaries: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources”, 
Association Suisse pour le Dialogue Euro-Arabo-Musulman, 2012; Jiménez García-carriazo, Á., 
“Prospecciones turcas en aguas chipriotas, una nueva dimensión del enfrentamiento”, Revista 
Española de Derecho Intrernacional, Vol 72, no 1, 2020, pp. 117-136; Letter dated 20 June 2011 
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of  Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-
General of  the United Nations concerning the Agreement between the Government of  the 
State of  Israel and the Government of  the Republic of  Cyprus on the Delimitation of  the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, signed in Nicosia on 17 December 2010.
32 Agreement between the Government of  the State of  Israel and the Government of  the 
Republic of  Cyprus on the Delimitation of  the Exclusive Economic Zone, signed in Nicosia 
on 17 December 2010 (entry into force 25 February 2011). 
33 marGhélis, A., “Les délimitations maritimes Turquie-gouvernement d’entente nationale 
libyen et Grèce-Égypte dans leur contexte régional”, Neptunus, Vol. 27, 2021/2.
34 The Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf  Laws 2004 and 2014.
35 Deposit by Cyprus of  a list of  geographical coordinates of  points, accompanied by an 
illustrative map, concerning the northern and north-western outer limits of  the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf, as contained in the Notification of  the Minister for 
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The Turkish Republic of  Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is recognised 
as a State only by Turkey, claims rights and authority over the maritime areas 
around the island of  Cyprus. TRNC and Turkey negotiated a maritime 
boundary delimitation agreement between the island of  Cyprus and Turkey.36 
The delimitation line, which refers exclusively to the continental shelf, is closer 
to Cyprus than to Turkey. In the wake of  the delimitation agreement, Turkey 
signed an ‘agreement’ with the TRNC with the latter ‘awarding’ concessions to 
the former for the waters lying adjacent to the northern, eastern and southern 
coasts of  Cyprus.37 During 2019 and 2020, Turkey has carried out drilling 
operations in contested waters.
Turkey’s coastlines are 8,333 km long and touch the Black, Marmara, 
Aegean, and Mediterranean seas. Turkey shares maritime boundaries with 
Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Syria, and now Libya as a result of  the MoU between 
Turkey and Libya. Its maritime border with Greece is complicated by the 
existence of  thousands of  islands. Meanwhile, the Turkish Government’s 
recognition of  the breakaway TRNC complicates the use of  Cypriot waters 
under international law since reached agreements are unlikely to be opposable 
to third States.38
Turkey has negotiated maritime boundary delimitation agreements with 
Libya, which ignores the Greek islands, as well as with the TRNC. There 
has already been rampant speculation regarding the potential for a maritime 
delimitation agreement between Egypt and Turkey.39
Foreign Affairs of  the Republic of  Cyprus made pursuant to article 3, paragraph 3, of  the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf  Laws.
36 Letter dated 25 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of  Turkey to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
37 ioannides, N., “Turkish Maritime Claims Offshore Cyprus”, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note, 
No. 18, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of  Nicosia, 2017, p. 6.
38 Baroudi, R., “Unlocking Peace and Prosperity: How to Resolve Maritime Border Disputes 
in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea?”, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy, 2020, p. 33.
39 Hacaoglu, S., “Turkey Signals Push for Deal on Maritime Boundary with Egypt”, Bloomberg, 
3 March 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-03/turkey-signals-push-
for-deal-on-maritime-boundary-with-egypt (accessed on 28 June 2021); Pedersen, G.F., “The 
Implications of  a Maritime Delimitation Agreement between Turkey and Egypt”, iGlobeNews, 
12 May 2021, https://www.iglobenews.org/the-implications-of-a-maritime-delimitation-
agreement-between-turkey-and-egypt/ (accessed on 28 June 2021).
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Greece’s coastlines stretch 13,676 km along the Aegean and Mediterranean 
seas. Greece possesses thousands of  islands scattered across these seas. The 
proximity of  some of  these smaller isolated islands to the Turkish coast leads 
to possible complications and conflicts in drawing maritime boundaries.40 
Greece and Egypt signed an agreement for the delimitation of  the two 
countries’ maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea on 6 August 
2020.41 The  Greece-Egypt agreement is geographically limited as it exclusively 
addresses part of  the full length of  the potential maritime boundary between 
both countries.42 Article 1(e) of  the agreement provides that any subsequent 
delimitation beyond the stipulated boundary in the agreement will be completed 
‘in consultation with the neighbouring States concerned’.43 This move has been 
rejected by Turkey44 since, in Turkey’s assessment, the agreement infringes on 
its continental shelf  and EEZ.45
40 Baroudi, R., op. cit., p. 29.
41 Agreement between the Government of  the Hellenic Republic and the Government of  the 
Arab Republic of  Egypt on the delimitation of  the exclusive economic zone between the two 
countries (adopted on 6 August 2020, entered into force 2 September 2020). 
42 yiallourides, C., “Part I: Some Observations on the Agreement between Greece and 
Egypt on the Delimitation of  the Exclusive Economic Zone”, 2020, EJIL Talk!, https://
www.ejiltalk.org/18969-2/ (accessed on 30 September 2021). 
43 This approach conforms with international case law. The tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen 
Arbitration considered, in light of  the presence of  third States in the relevant area that: ‘It will, 
therefore, be necessary to terminate either end of  the boundary line in such a way as to avoid 
trespassing upon an area where other claims might fall to be considered. It is, however, clearly 
necessary to consider the choices of  the base points controlling the median line first, and 
then to look at the cautionary termination matter when the line to be thus terminated at its 
northern and southern ends has been produced’. Eritrea v Yemen, Award on maritime delimitation, 
(1999) XXII RIAA 335, (2001) 17 December 1999, PCA, para 136.
44 Note verbale dated 14 August 2020 from the Permanent Mission of  Turkey to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
45 Furthermore, Athens and Rome signed an agreement on 9 June 2020 regarding the 
delimitation of  the EEZ in the Ionian Sea. The agreement effectively extends the limit 
of  the continental shelf  established in 1977 to the water column. Agreement between the 
Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic on the Delimitation of  the Respective Continental 
Shelf  Areas of  the two States (adopted 24 May 1977, entered into force 12 November 
1980); “Greece, Italy sign accord on maritime zones in Ionian Sea”, Reuters, 9 June 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-italy-foreign-idUSKBN23G0X5 (accessed on 6 
July 2021); marGhélis, A., “The maritime delimitation agreement between Greece and Italy 
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Egypt has 2,450 km of  coastlines split between the Mediterranean and 
Red seas. Egypt shares borders with Israel, Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. Egypt 
also shares a maritime border with Gaza under an agreement negotiated with 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1994.46
Libya is not a party to UNCLOS. However, Libya has not been reluctant 
to resort to the International Court of  Justice and has obtained two favourable 
delimitation decisions: in 1982 against Tunisia47 and in 1985 against Malta.48
Starting in 2004, Libya held four rounds of  negotiations with Greece 
involving experts from both countries. Those negotiations failed to produce 
any result because of  the different interpretation of  the legal status of  islands. 
Correspondence between the two sides continued until 2014.49
In the post-Gaddafi era, the Libyan maritime delimitation agenda was de 
facto frozen, until the GNA signed the controversial MoU with Turkey in 2019 
which shook up the regional delimitation agenda after a decade of  deadlock 
in this area.50
III. LIBYA AND TURKEY MOU
On 27 November 2019, the Governments of  Turkey and the GNA signed 
a MoU to delimit their continental shelves and the EEZs in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea. The MoU establishes an 18.6 nautical mile maritime 
boundary between Turkey and Libya, creating a maritime corridor between 
both countries.51
of  9 June 2020: An analysis in the light of  International Law, national interest and regional 
politics”, Marine Policy 126, 2021.
46 Baroudi, R., op. cit., p. 53.
47 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf  (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgement, [1982] ICJ 
Reports 1982, p. 18.
48 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf  (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgement, [1985] ICJ 
Reports 1985, p. 13.
49 Letter dated 26 December 2019 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of  the Permanent Mission 
of  Libya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
50 marGhélis, A., op. cit. 
51 Kansu, Z. N., “An Assessment of  Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
Agreement Between Turkey and Libya”, Science Journal of  Turkish Military Academy, 2020, 
Volume 30, Issue 1, pp. 51-84, p. 66.
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The Memorandum consists of  a preamble and six articles. Article 1 defines 
the boundaries of  the continental shelf  and exclusive economic zone between 
the two States “in accordance with applicable internationally recognized 
standards.”52 The Memorandum has two annexes. Annex 1 is a map that 
shows the maritime boundary between the two countries. Annex 2 gives base 
coordinates for delimiting the continental shelf  and the EEZ between Libya 
and Turkey. On 1 October 2020, the Secretary-General of  the United Nations 
registered the Turkey-Libya MoU.53
As a consequence of  the MoU, Greek islands in the Eastern Mediterranean 
(including the large islands of  Crete and Rhodes) are denied any continental 
52 Letter dated 26 December 2019 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of  the Permanent Mission 
of  Libya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
53 Gunerigok, S., “UN registers Turkey-Libya maritime deal”, Anadolu Ajansı, 1 October 2020, 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/un-registers-turkey-libya-maritime-deal/1992682 
(accessed on 7 July 2021).
Figure 1: Competing claims over the Eastern Mediterranean
Source: Turkey’s Ministry of  Foreign Affairs; Anadolu Ajansı; Greek Government; Flanders 
Marine Institute.
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shelf  or EEZ and restricts their maritime entitlements to a 12 nautical mile 
territorial sea.54
The drive towards this bilateral agreement strategy is responsive to different 
incentives.55 For Libya, the motivation is mostly security. The agreement was 
reached with Fayez al-Serraj, Head of  the Tripoli-based Government, who is 
in conflict with a rival military force in eastern Libya under General Khalifa 
Haftar. Turkey has promised to step up military and other assistance to Serraj. 
Libya’s eastern-based parliament, which is aligned with Haftar, has rejected the 
MoU.56
For Turkey, the MoU was concluded in a context in which Ankara 
considers itself  to be aggrieved by the delimitation of  boundaries taking place 
in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as of  the exploitation and transit of  
the gas through the region.57 On the one hand, Ankara is resentful about the 
agreements ratified by its neighbours as they are detrimental to its interests. The 
evolving cooperation between Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus – as reflected, 
for example, in their recent establishment of  an Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Forum (EMGF)58 – is seen by Turkey as an effort of  isolation.59 As President 
Erdoğan has stated: “Egypt, Greek Cyprus, Greece, and Israel all try at 
different times to impose their sovereignty over the region in isolation from 
54 talmon, s., loBo, m., “The Intricacies of  Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Germany’s 
One-Sided Response to the Turkey-Libya MoU on Delimitation of  the Maritime Jurisdiction 
Areas in the Mediterranean”, GPIL-German Practice on International Law, https://gpil.jura.uni-
bonn.de/2020/03/the-intricacies-of-maritime-boundary-delimitation-germanys-one-sided-
response-to-the-turkey-libya-mou-on-delimitation-of-the-maritime-jurisdiction-areas-in-the-
mediterranean/ (accessed on 1 July 2021).
55 lindenstrauss, G., Feuer, s., winter, o., n 25 supra; BaKer, l., GumruKcu, t., KamBas, 
m., n 10 supra. 
56 Baker, L., Gumrukcu, T., Kambas, M., loc. cit.. 
57 marGhélis, A., op. cit. 
58 The EMGF was announced in 2019 in Cairo. In 2020, it transformed into an international 
intergovernmental organization based in Cairo that includes Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Jordan and Palestine. The establishment of  the EMGF responds to the need for a regionally 
coordinated effort to unlock the full potential of  Eastern Mediterranean offshore gas wealth. 
Forum members aim to involve the private sector and financial institutions to improve the 
prospects for profitable exploitation of  the gas reserves. suKKarieh, M., “The East Mediterranean 
Gas Forum: Regional Cooperation Amid Conflicting Interests”, NRGI, 2020.
59 lindenstrauss, G., Feuer, s., winter, o., n 25 supra.
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Turkey”, and added that the memorandum “has foiled certain conspiracies 
against Turkey.”60
On the other hand, the delimitation line drawn by Ankara and Tripoli 
crosses the area through which the East Med gas pipeline is planned to run.61 
Turkey has fiercely opposed to this project which has led Ankara to believe 
that it is being isolated and encircled in the Eastern Mediterranean.62 With this 
MoU, Turkey gives legal status to its jurisdiction in the area. Consequently, 
Turkish authorization for the construction of  the East Med gas pipeline would 
be necessary.63
Signing such an agreement seems a strategic move for Turkey, as it gives 
it the superficial legitimacy it lacks in order to move in on the area.64 It would 
confirm what Ankara has been arguing for years: that the islands are not 
entitled to a continental shelf  under law.65
Despite its designation as MoU, the deal constitutes a binding international 
treaty,66 in terms of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.67 The 
document meets the requirements of  a treaty in terms of  Article 2(1)(a) of  
said Convention.68 This becomes clear from the text of  the MoU, which speaks 
of  “Parties”, “entry into force”, and “agreement” as well as the fact that the 
60 araB center For research and policy studies, “The Libya-Turkey Memorandum of  
Understanding: Local and Regional Repercussions”, Arab Center Washington DC, http://
arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/the-libya-turkey-memorandum-of-understanding-local-
and-regional-repercussions/ (accessed on 7 July 2021). 
61 hacaoGlu, S., n 39 supra.
62 erciyes, N., n 19 supra. 
63 marGhélis, A., op. cit. 
64 Syrigos, A., “Turkey-Libya agreement: A move with consequences”, Ekathimerini, 30 
November 2019, https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/246999/turkey-libya-agreement-
a-move-with-consequences/ (accessed on 7 July 2021).
65 Ibid. 
66 Vid. contrary views in Gunavan, Y. et al.: “The validity of  Turkey-Libya´s Agreement on 
maritime boundaries in International Law”, Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan, 9 (2), pp. 170 – 185.
67 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) UNTS vol. 1155, p. 331.
68 According to Article 2(1)(a) “treaty” means an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
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MoU is to be registered with Secretariat of  the United Nations pursuant to 
Article 102 of  the UN Charter.69
The MoU has been described as a game-changer in the Eastern 
Mediterranean as it rewrites the boundary lines and gives Turkey a significant 
say in transnational gas exploration and pipeline construction.70
As stated by President Erdoğan, this new relation between Ankara and 
Tripoli “would allow Turkey to legally carry out drilling on Libya’s continental 
shelf  with Tripoli’s approval [...]. With this new agreement between Turkey and 
69 talmon, s., loBo, M., op. cit.
70 Cohen, A. “Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Upsets Mediterranean Energy Plan”,  Forbes, 8 
January 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/01/08/turkey-libya-maritime-
deal-upsets-mediterranean-energy-plan/#6209c3ff6bee (accessed on 12 July 2021). 
Figure 2: Delimitation of  the EEZs in the Eastern Mediterranean, the East 
Med pipeline, the Turkish claims and the Turkey-Libya Memorandum of  
Understanding
Source: Philippe Morgan de Rivery, based on data from International Energy Agency, Wood 
Mackenzie, CSIS.
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Libya, we can hold joint exploration operations in these exclusive economic 
zones that we determined.”71
Furthermore, in the light of  the new agreements, other regional countries 
could not conduct exploration for gas reserves or laying pipelines without first 
getting permission from Turkey.72 After the agreement with Tripoli, Erdoğan 
emphasized: “We will use our rights under international law and maritime law 
until the end in the Eastern Mediterranean.”73
The Turkey-GNA deal is part of  the Turkish new maritime strategy: the 
“Blue Homeland” or Mavi Vatan in Turkish, which is based on the claim of  a 
vast maritime domain.74 By strengthening Turkish-Libyan military cooperation 
and encroaching on Greece’s claimed maritime zones, Turkey has shown it 
is not afraid of  confrontation with those who would limit its maritime 
ambitions.75
Ultimately, the MoU was presented as an initiative which attempted to 
counter Greece’s “maximalist” EEZ and continental shelf  claims.76 The MoU 
gave expression to Ankara’s maximalist strategy, which, in case of  disputed 
maritime jurisdiction areas, denies islands any EEZ and continental shelf  until 
an agreement on delimitation has been reached between the claimant States.77
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Dalloui, M.A., “Turkey’s efforts to delimit its maritime boundaries have prompted a 
colonial response”,  Middle East Monitor, 17 December 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20191217-turkeys-effort-to-delimit-its-maritime-boundaries-have-prompted-a-colonial-
response/ (accessed on 12 July 2021).
74 The origin of  Blue Homeland doctrine can be dated back to 2006 when it is first used by Rear 
Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. Today, the use of  Blue Homeland term has exponentially proliferated in 
Turkish politics to refer to Turkey’s maritime stakes in Eastern Mediterranean. It is most often used 
as a shorthand expression for Ankara’s maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Gingeras, R. 
“Blue Homeland: the Heated Politics behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy”, War on the Rocks, 
2 June 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/bluehomeland-the-heated-politics-behind-
turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/ (accessed on 13 July 2021).
75 denizeau, A., “Mavi Vatan, the “Blue Homeland”: the Origins, Influences and Limits of  an 
Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey”, Etudes de l’Ifri, Ifri, 2021, p. 7.
76 Based on the assumption that islands, irrespective of  their location or geographical 
circumstances, automatically generate full maritime zones.
77 talmon, s., loBo, M., op. cit. 
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IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION REACTION
The public disclosure of  the MoU prompted protests from several States,78 
especially Greece, as the agreement ignores the presence of  the Greek islands 
of  Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo, which lie between the coasts of  Turkey 
and Libya, undermining Greek sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
The latest events have heightened the tensions in the region. The MoU 
pushed Greece to expel the Libyan Ambassador from Athens and to finalise 
quickly an agreement with Egypt. Greece put its navy on high alert and has 
been conducting military exercises at sea, accompanied by French vessels. 
Joint military exercises have also been conducted by France, Italy, Cyprus, and 
Greece.79
A challenge to the Greek maritime borders is essentially a challenge to the 
EU’s external borders. Lack of  final delimitations, as well as conflicting claims, 
78 France, Greece, Egypt and Cyprus declared “null and void” the agreement between Turkey 
and Libya assigning Turkey rights over a vast area of  the eastern Mediterranean. Statement 
issued by the four Ministers for Foreign Affairs. “Turkey-Libya deals ‘void’: Egypt, France, 
Greece, Cyprus”, France24, 8 January 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200108-turkey-
libya-deals-void-egypt-france-greece-cyprus (accessed on 21 July 2021). The Ministers of  
Foreign Affairs of  Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, France and the United Arab Emirates have adopted 
a Joint Declaration in which they reiterate that the MoU between Turkey and Mr. Fayez El Saraj 
is in contravention of  international law and infringes upon the sovereign rights of  third States, 
does not comply with the Law of  the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third 
States. Joint Declaration adopted by the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs of  Cyprus, Egypt, France, 
Greece and the United Arab Emirates (11 May 2020). During the Med7 meeting of  September 
2020 held in Ajaccio, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Greece condemned 
Turkish actions in the eastern Mediterranean and reaffirmed their support for a settlement of  
the dispute based on international law, adding that they would push for sanctions at the next 
EU summit if  Turkey does not stop its unilateral actions. Ajaccio declaration after the 7th 
Summit of  the Southern EU countries, MED7, 10 September 2020. The United States State 
Department described the maritime agreement between Ankara and Tripoli as “unhelpful” and 
“provocative”. Chrysopoulos, P., “US Backs Greece in Dispute Over Turkey-Libya Maritime 
Deal”, Greek Reporter, 5 June 2020, https://greekreporter.com/2020/06/05/us-backs-greece-
in-dispute-over-turkey-libya-maritime-deal/ (accessed on 19 July 2021).
79 “Greece, Cyprus, Italy, France to Hold Military Exercises From Wednesday”, The Defense 
Post, 26 August 2020, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/08/26/military-exercises-
mediterranean/ (accessed on 20 July 2021). 
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create uncertainty over the geographical extent of  the EU80 and result in 
destabilisation, thereby increasing the economic risk of  EU energy initiatives, 
in particular the planned East Med gas pipeline.81 The pipeline project as well as 
the EMGF have also benefitted from active EU support, particularly financial 
support from EU institutions.82 Observed by Ankara, these developments 
contributed to a growing conviction about the EU lack of  neutrality in the 
evolving Eastern Mediterranean dispute.83
The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of  a cooperative and mutually 
beneficial relationship with Turkey.84 The EU has condemned Turkey’s actions 
as unacceptable. Member States agree that Turkey should abstain from 
unilateral actions and resolve its disputes with Greece through dialogue and 
negotiation in good faith.85 
Few days after the adoption of  the MoU, the European Council asserted 
that the deal infringes upon the sovereign rights of  Greece, does not comply 
with the law of  the sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third 
States. It reaffirmed its solidarity with Athens regarding these actions by 
Turkey.86
80 Union Of  European Federalists, “The Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean is a European 
Problem which Needs a European Solution”, 2020, https://www.federalists.eu/fileadmin/
files_uef/Pictures/Secretariat/Easternmed.pdf  (accessed on 20 July 2021).
81 Zaręba, S., “Delimitation of  Maritime Areas in the Eastern Mediterranean as a Challenge for the 
EU”, Bulletin PISM, 2020, https://pism.pl/publications/Delimitation_of_Maritime_Areas_in_
the_Eastern_Mediterranean_as_a_Challenge_for_the_EU (accessed on 16 July 2021).
82 Baconi, T., “Pipelines and pipedreams. How the EU can support a regional gas hub in the 
Eastern Mediterranean”, European Council of  Foreign Relations, 2017, https://ecfr.eu/archive/
page/-/ECFR211_-_PIPELINES_AND_PIPEDREAMS.pdf  (accessed on 22 July 2021).
83 dessì, A., “Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean: Navigating Complexity, Mitigating 
Conflict(s) and Fishing for Compromise” in Tachum, M., Eastern Mediterranean in Uncharted 
Waters: Perspectives on Emerging Geopolitical Realities, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 27, 2020, p. 68. 
84 European Council, Conclusions, 1-2 October 2020, Brussels, EUCO 13/20.
85 Ibid; Scazzieri, L., “The EU and the Eastern Mediterranean flashpoint”, Aspenia, 2020, 
https://aspeniaonline.it/the-eu-and-the-eastern-mediterranean-flashpoint/ (accessed on 16 
July 2021). 
86 European Council, Conclusions, 1-2 October 2020... cit.
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As a member of  the EU, Greece has been insistently urging the EU to 
impose sanctions on Turkey.87 In order to curb tensions, the Council imposed 
a sanction scheme targeting natural and legal persons, which includes an asset-
freeze on natural persons or entities responsible for, involved in or assisting 
drilling activities.88 
A year later, the European Council continued to criticize Turkey for 
engaging in unilateral actions and provocations as well as escalating its rhetoric 
against the EU.89 As a result, the Council stated that it would consider extending 
the scope of  and adopting additional listings to, the restrictive measures 
adopted in November 2019. However, given the EU’s strategic interest in 
the development of  a cooperative relationship with Turkey, the Union has 
offered a positive EU-Turkey agenda to promote a genuine partnership with 
the EU and its member States and to resolve differences through dialogue and 
in accordance with international law.90 The European Council also endorsed 
the idea of  convening a multilateral conference for the Eastern Mediterranean 
in an attempt to ease regional tensions about gas reserves and maritime 
boundaries.91 
Regardless of  the goodwill, leaders agreed that if  Turkey did not halt its 
unilateral actions, the EU would use all “instruments and the options at its 
87 Including embargoes against Turkey and the breaking off  of  EU accession talks. axt, H. 
J., “Troubled Water in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey Challenges Greece and Cyprus 
Regarding Energy Resources”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, vol. 69, no. 1, 2021, pp. 
133-152, p. 146.
88 European Council (CFSP), Decision 2019/1894 of  11 November 2019 concerning restrictive 
measures in view of  Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
89 European Council, Conclusions, 11 December 2020, Brussels, EUCO 22/20.
90 Ibid.
91 European Council, n 84 supra. President of  the European Council Charles Michel, confirmed 
this position: “On the one hand, we confirm that we are willing to give political dialogue a 
chance to forge progress towards greater stability and predictability in the mutual interest of  
all concerned. On the other hand, we state our firm commitment to our principles and values. 
And this is the tenor of  the support that we have reiterated to Greece and Cyprus. It is also the 
tenor of  a message we are sending out: we are ready to engage in a more positive agenda with 
Turkey, provided that Turkey also engages in a more positive approach and puts an end to 
unilateral actions that are contrary to international law”. Remarks by President Charles Michel 
after the Special European Council meeting on 1 October 2020.
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disposal”, a rather vague reference to possible future sanctions.92 “Restrictive 
measures” were announced for discussion.93 
Member States aim to foster a less confrontational and dysfunctional EU-
Turkey relationship. However, they disagree on the best way to achieve this.94 
At the European Council on 1st and 2nd October 2020, it became evident that 
the EU had not made the decision regarding sanctions as one homogeneous 
entity.95 Greece and Cyprus, supported by France,96 Luxembourg, Ireland, the 
Czech Republic, and Austria, were emphatic about being firm with Ankara 
and imposing sanctions on Turkey as State.97 On the other side, countries like 
Germany,98 Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Spain have taken a 
more cautious stance, offering diplomacy a chance and avoiding escalating the 
conflict.99 In this sense, Berlin has been depicted as “lead mediator”, Paris as 
“agitator”, and Rome as “balancer”.100
After the continuous provocative actions by Turkey towards Greece, in 
particular Turkish overflights of  Greek inhabited areas as well as threatening 
naval exercises, the situation began to change towards the end of  2020.101 
Turkey broadly welcomed the European Council conclusions of  11 December 
2020 and started sending signals on the importance attached to the relationship 
92 European Council, Conclusions, 1-2 October 2020... cit.; Scazzieri, L., loc. cit.
93 European Council,Conclusions, 11 December 2020... cit.; axt, H-J., op. cit., p. 146. 
94 Scazzieri, L., loc. cit. 
95 axt, H-J., op. cit., p. 146.
96 France is the leading voice supporting Greece and Cyprus. Paris has come to see Turkey 
as a leading threat not only to its interests in the region but also to European security more 
generally. French President Emmanuel Macron accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan of  pursuing an “expansionist policy, mixing nationalism and Islamism, which is 
incompatible with European interests and is a factor for destabilisation”, L’Orient-Le Jour, 
20 August 2020, https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1229913/pour-macron-la-politique-
derdogan-est-un-facteur-de-destabilisation-de-leurope.html (accessed on 20 July 2021).
97 Ibid., scazzieri, L., loc. cit.
98 So far, Germany has been a stabilising force in the tense dynamics between Turkey, the EU 
and some member States. Berlin has used shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara to 
get the two sides to sit at the negotiation table.
99 Ibid. 
100 dessì, A., n 83 supra, p. 70.
101 Joint Communication to the European Council, “State of  play of  EU-Turkey political, 
economic and trade relations”, Brussels 22 March 2021, JOIN(2021) 8 final/2.
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with the EU.102 Now that the EU has set out a positive offer to Turkey, the ball 
is in Ankara’s court: a durable de-escalation of  tensions depends on whether 
President Erdoğan believes he benefits more from confrontation or improved 
relations with Europe.103 
To date, messages of  reengagement have continued and a positive 
momentum for dialogue and negotiations has been created.104 A grouping 
of  EU States led by Germany, the European Commission and the High 
Representative of  the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep 
Borrell, have laboured to create a conducive environment based on dialogue 
for sustainable de-escalation in the region.105 The withdrawal of  Turkey’s 
seismic exploration vessel Oruç Reis allowed for the resumption of  Greek-
Turkish direct bilateral talks on 25 January 2021. The 62nd round of  talks took 
place on 16 March 2021 in Athens, back to back with political consultations at 
high officials’ level.106
V. CONCLUSIONS
The overall long-standing friction in the Eastern Mediterranean is 
multifaceted. Undefined boundaries constitute a breeding ground for 
litigation. The major natural gas deposits which were discovered in the region 
added a new dimension to the evolving security complex. In this context, the 
availability of  different legal arguments to support conflict claims encourages 
States to conclude agreements with third States in an attempt to establish faits 
accomplis at the expense of  their neighbours.107
The maritime delimitation dispute between Greece and Turkey appeared 
to be insurmountable for a long time. The dispute reached its peak in 2019 
102 Ibid.
103 Scazzieri, L., loc. cit.
104 Joint Communication to the European Council, “State of  play of  EU-Turkey political, 
economic and trade relations”, Brussels 22 March 2021, JOIN(2021) 8 final/2.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. 
107 Neubert, M., Yüksel, U., “What a Judicial Solution to DISPUTEs in the Eastern Mediterranean 
Might Look Like”, EUROPP, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/06/02/what-
a-judicial-solution-to-disputes-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-might-look-like/ (accessed on 
19 July 2021).
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with the adoption of  the MoU between Turkey and GNA with which Ankara 
was sending a message not to be ignored in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Neither Turkey nor the GNA can easily revoke a legally binding agreement. 
Similarly, pipeline contracts have a long implementation period and cannot be 
terminated without costs.108 However, in order to maintain relations between 
Turkey, Libya and Greece as neighbouring States, the delimitation agreement 
must be supported by the three parties.109
Despite the international tension created by the MoU, it seems that 2019’s 
tempers have cooled but that could also be depicted as an extremely fragile 
truce. This might be the conducive environment for the settlement of  the 
dispute by negotiations and/or resort to an international dispute settlement 
organ. What is clear is that only a solution in line with international law would 
bring security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, facilitating the 
enjoyment of  offshore natural resources by all the regional States.110
The Union and its member States, instead of  taking sides, should engage 
with parties involved in the conflictive area and urge them to the resolution 
of  pending issues, taking an active role in sponsoring the negotiations.111 The 
EU should be able to send clear, unequivocal and precise messages and convey 
that a weaker or destabilised Turkey is not in the EU’s interests.112 Greater EU 
cohesion in relation to action in the Eastern Mediterranean requires intensive 
discussion behind the scenes, in which all member States should strive to think 
in terms of  EU-wide long-term interests and leave short-term political tactics 
behind.113
The figure of  the High Representative should be strengthened as the 
diplomatic mediator in the region. The High Representative could conduct 
political dialogue with Turkey on behalf  of  the Union. This does not preclude 
108 Ibid. 
109 Gunavan, Y. et al., n 66 supra.
110 ioannides, N., “The maritime dispute between Cyprus and Turkey in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea”, Eastern Mediterranean Affairs Magazine, pp. 9-14, p. 14. 
111 BicKl, T., “EU v. Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean: a good moment to sponsor dispute 
settlement”, The NCLOS Blog, 2020, https://site.uit.no/nclos/2020/09/30/eu-v-turkey-in-
the-eastern-mediterranean-a-good-moment-to-sponsor-dispute-settlement/.
112 soler i lecha, E., “The EU and the Eastern Mediterranean: how to deal with Turkey”, 
CIDOB notes internationals, 251, 2021.
113 Ibid. 
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diplomatic work in cooperation with other entities, including the State holding 
the Presidency of  the Council of  the European Union.
The crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean could be an opportunity to 
consolidate the High Representative’s role as a diplomatic player. The more 
time that passes without concrete achievements, the more difficult it will be 
for the EU to maintain its favourable position. In this context, the Union’s 
efforts become even more urgent. Ultimately, a peaceful resolution of  the 
conflict will serve the interests of  the Eastern Mediterranean countries, as well 
as the Union at large.
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